Again, thank you for asking me to be here today,

and I would like to have my statement entered into the record as well.

My comments will draw upon my experience as

Deputy at UNSCOM from 1993 until 2000. I came to know many

Iraqis and their organizations quite well. They saw me both as a

U.N. official and also as an American with whom they could talk, and sometimes quite candidly.

Let me state from the outset that I support the objective of creating

the conditions where the Iraqi people can establish a new

leadership in Baghdad. There is a strong case for this, when you

consider the growing risks posed by the current regime, in contrast

with what Iraq could be under normal leadership.

The talent and resources that can design and build nuclear

weapons under Saddam can help Iraq be the leading economy and

culture of the Middle East under new government. Until that happens,

the Iraqi people will never achieve their enormous potential. Of course, getting there is the issue.

I have a differing opinion from Dr. Gallucci. In my opinion, weapons

inspections are not the answer to the real problem, which is

the regime, nor can they even fully eliminate in perpetuity Iraqi

weapons of mass destruction so long as this regime is in power,

and I would make another comment here in terms of terminology.

Earlier this morning, there was a lot of talk about arms control,

but what we are discussing with respect to Iraq is coercive disarmament.

Iraq initiated a war, they lost, and part of the terms of

the cease-fire agreement were that it was supposed to get rid of a

large part of its arsenal, and that was to be verified by UNSCOM.

That is not really arms control in the classical sense, where two

parties enter into an agreement because they think it is in their

common interest. Iraq steadfastly does not believe that it is in its interest to get rid of these weapons.

Here I come to a key problem that I see in this whole dynamic,

and that is that the forces are all wrong. The Security Council

writes resolutions demanding Iraq give up weapons of mass destruction

capabilities which the regime believes are essential to its

survival. UNSCOM was created to attempt to implement this objective.

We did a lot. Bob Gallucci did a lot. Richard Butler did a lot.

All of our experts on the ground, they did the most, but ultimately

Baghdad had vastly more resources than we did, and much more endurance than the Security Council.

Ultimately, the Security Council was not willing to commit the

resources to enforce compliance. Saddam very cleverly divided the

Council with threats, rewards, and ultimately by holding his own

people hostage. He created a situation where Council members did

not want to see more pain fall on innocent Iraqis as a consequence of support to inspectors.

This will no doubt happen again, and here again I would point

out the same dynamic occurred after World War I. The Versailles

Treaty obligated the Germans to disarm. The international community

created a bunch of inspection teams. They had the same problems,

they lasted about the same length of time, and it ultimately failed.

But even if you can imagine a radically different approach to inspections

with a sizable military force, I do not see how that would

work over the long term. Can we keep forces deployed to support

inspections forever? Are we really prepared to give back to this regime

control of the oil revenues? And pursuing this approach does

nothing for the innocent Iraqis trapped under this government.

In essence, inspections in my opinion are only a short term palliative,

and do not address the fundamental problem. Saddam

knows this, and if he concludes we are really preparing for regime

change, he will offer the concession of allowing inspectors in under

some conditions. This will only be a tactical retreat on his part.

I want to make a second point now before I conclude. Finally—

and this has to do with regime change—there is a central point

that is simple, but it is a central point on regime change, and that

is that it is fundamentally a political objective, not a military one.

Military commitment will be essential to convince various audiences

we are serious this time and Saddam’s days are numbered.

However, creating the conditions for new leadership in Baghdad

demands a political strategy to guide potential military action.

Moreover, what we do in a nonmilitary realm before potential conflict

will directly affect the extent of possible military conflict and

the amount of damage to Iraq and ourselves.

In this light, it is essential that Iraqis in Iraq know that their

lot will only improve when the current regime is gone. Iraqis and

key institutions in Iraq should understand that their interests are

not served by defending Saddam and his clique. We can make a

good case that intervention is justified, given the unique and dangerous characteristics of this regime.

My guess is that with sufficient work and consultations we can

build international support to create conditions for regime change,

and a consensus on characteristics we expect a new government to

achieve. Moreover, we can make decisions about such matters as

relieving sanctions, establishing security relations, and debt relief,

based upon how the new government progresses toward higher

standards, but I reiterate, our highest priority should be convincing

Iraqis in Iraq that they will be better off when Saddam has gone,

and that he will be gone. Iraqis and their institutions will be making vital decisions about

their future without Saddam. The Iraqi people are the greatest

threat to Saddam’s regime. If they are convinced Saddam and his

clique are doomed, they will make decisions that are in their interest

and our interest, and any ultimate use of force can be minimized.

Finally, let me just make a comment, a personal comment. I remember

asking a senior Iraqi once whether he served his country

or Saddam. It was not possible for him to answer, but he definitely

understood the difference. In essence, we need to make it possible

for the Iraqi people to act in the interests of their country and not Saddam Hussein. Thank you.

I would just briefly add that not all weapons of

mass destruction are created equal. Chemical and biological agents

present one level of concern, but when Saddam gets a nuclear

weapon, and he has had this intent, he has devoted enormous resources

over two decades to do that, then everything will change.

We would not be sitting here talking about the potential of a military

action against Iraq if we suspected he had a nuclear weapon.

He knows that. I have had this discussion with very senior

Iraqis. They know that had they invaded Kuwait after they possessed

a nuclear weapon, it might be a very different outcome. So,

I think that it is a key inflection point when they get a nuclear weapon.

The other thing is, picking up a bit on your analysis of the dynamic

of the issue, what we are seeing here is, it is very easy to

quantify, identify near-term costs. It is very difficult to firmly identify

long term benefits and long term risks. Budget analysts, politicians,

go through this problem all the time, and the fact that we

are here and my colleagues are here saying there is a lot of nearterm

risks, that is true, we can see those, but ultimately there is

a very long-term concern which is very, very big and that is, I

think, what characterizes much of the debate.

Thank you very much. I think these are fundamental

issues. In essence what needs to happen is, Iraqis and Iraq

need to conclude that it is in their interest and it is patriotic for

them as proud Iraqis to change their leadership.

Well, I think the international community can

make a case that this regime is a danger to the external world, it

is also a danger to the internal world in Iraq. We should not be

prescriptive as to whom should lead Iraq, but I think we can say

that there are certain standards, ideals that we would expect a follow-

on government to embody to a greater or lesser degree.

This also has the important advantage of avoiding identifying

groups of people within Iraq who would very shortly fall into the

list of Saddam’s most wanted people, but if we identify characteristics

and ideals which no one can dispute, pluralism, elections, fixing

the financial system, getting rid of weapons of mass destruction,

these are ideals which the external community would support

and patriot Iraqis could also support.

In my experience in talking with lots of Iraqis is

that they recognize Saddam as their leader, but they also recognize

his shortcomings. They would like nothing better than to be reconnected

to the rest of the world. They see enormous benefit in that,

but I do not think they are going to be wanting to see someone impose a leader on them.

There are very delicate balances which you will hear from in the

next panel within Iraq, the north, middle, south, clans, military,

various institutions, but I think there is a solution set there. I

think we should make it clear that we want to change as much in

Iraq as possible, meaning the top leadership, and as little as possible

at least from the outside. In other words, cause as little damage to the infrastructure as possible.

We ought to make it clear that most Iraqis have everything to

gain and little to lose by a change in management.

I tried to get a little bit at the point you were raising

when I said what we need to do ahead of time is do our political

groundwork, both with respect to Iraqis in Iraq, Iraqis outside

of Iraq, the opposition, but also with some key capitals on this, and

I think a discussion about the characteristics of a follow-on government

that we would expect to see is one mechanism for involving

a lot of important voices, some overtly, some perhaps not overtly,

into putting forward a picture of what we expect Iraq will be on

the other side, but without being prescriptive, in other words, not

being in a position where we are trying to impose something on the Iraqi people.

But I think there is a delicate balance and delicate work that has

to be done politically which includes people in Iraq, and that obviously

is something that is not necessarily what we can be discussing

in an open session, but none of this is guaranteed. There

are enormous risks, economic risks, loyal interests, all of that sort

of thing. There is a big risk that Saddam will be able to characterize

what we are doing as trying to put in place a puppet, and

nothing will solidify the Iraqi people to oppose us, nothing will

cause more bodies to come back in bags, ultimately, than if the

Iraqi people are put in a position where they see supporting Saddam as being the patriotic act.

What we need to do is carefully separate Saddam from patriotic

acts for regular Iraqis, Iraqis in the army, Iraqis in the Republican

Guard, even the Special Republican Guard, even the security services.

We need to make Saddam feel very lonely. I think there is a

strategy out there which can do this, both with our allies, with capitals.

I think it rests on causing audiences in various locations,

most especially in Iraq, though, to think about their relationship

with the next government in Baghdad, and when they start doing that, Saddam will be very lonely.

Senator, it is for exactly those points that you are

raising that I emphasize that we need a very well thought out set

of political organizing principles. In a sense, there are national in-

stitutions in Iraq that hold the country together, the regular army,

there are departments of agriculture, irrigation, there is a civil

service, there are clans which span the length and breadth of the

country, and they need to feel that their interests will be preserved

in what comes next, but it is very important that whatever we do

not be seen as imposing something upon them, but simply allowing them to replace their own leadership.

If they wind up in a position where Saddam is saying, here

comes the Americans, they want to destroy the great nation of Iraq

and put in place a puppet, then I think we are headed for a big mess.

I think if we posit that we will judge the next government

in Iraq based on how it proceeds toward behaving more

normally, toward pluralism, and say we are going to make our decisions

about security relations, about debt relief, about adjusting the

sanctions—we need to get out of this box that we are in, and I have

no idea how we got in it, where the notion of changing the management

in Baghdad is seen as something anti-Arab.

I mean, Saddam has done a great job in speaking to the Arabs

in the street, as they are called, via al Jazeera and other mechanisms,

saying the United States is against the Arabs because the

United States wants me out of power. I mean, logically there is

nothing better I can imagine for the Arab people that if Saddam

left and the Iraqi people were able to achieve their enormous potential,

and there is enormous agreement that they have enormous potential.

You raise a very important point, both with respect

to an individual, but with respect to a general problem, and

I have had over the years some serious conversations with Iraqis

about how Americans target, and what they do, and so on and so

forth, and it might be useful to just say what their impression is.

Their impression, their thing is, Americans cannot take casualties.

This is part of the motivation for weapons of mass destruction.

I had a discussion on September 18, 1995, late at night, with

Iraqis, where Iraqis first discussed with us their concept of the use

of weapons of mass destruction, and what they did prior to the

commencement of the conflict in 1991, and it has been said before, but I think it bears on this.

They deployed weapons, they filled them, they predelegated the

authority to use them if the United States went to Baghdad, and

they believe that that contributed to the decision not to go to Baghdad.

Again, the notion is, the United States cannot take casualties,

but more than that, they also saw what happened at the end of the

gulf war, when we ended the fighting after 100 hours. Why? Well,

one of the factors which they saw was, here is television pictures

of the Road of Death, so not only can Washington not stand to take

casualties itself, they do not even like it when Iraqis are casualties.

And if you add to that the experience of the last decade, where

as I mentioned in my testimony Saddam has taken his own population

hostage, the international community cannot sustain its will

because Saddam is causing his own people to pay an enormous price.

Now, all of this philosophy is going to weave itself into how they

defend themselves against perceived attack, including collocating

civilian and military targets, such that no weapon, no matter how

smart, is going to be able to distinguish between the two, and we

just have to be able to take that into course.